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City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co.' was the first Supreme
Court case in twelve years in which a majority agreed on a single
standard of equal protection review for a race-specific preference
program. The Court employed the strict scrutiny standard and sig-
nalled a departure from the prelapsarian era when all affirmative
action programs were accorded constitutional latitude.2 But the
import of Croson is not limited to the invocation of strict scrutiny:
it was the first time that a majority required a stringent factual
record of explicit past discrimination to justify an affirmative ac-
tion program.3
Croson has had a mesmeric effect on conservative judges;
though the decision was specifically directed at programs for racial
minorities, these judges have interpreted the opinion to require the
strict scrutiny standard for gender-based preference programs. 4
Other courts have applied the law as they found it: they appropri-
ately continue to use the traditional intermediate scrutiny test.5
Two courts have been more creative, and more damaging. They ap-
plied intermediate scrutiny but required an exacting Croson-style
factual predicate to justify gender-based affirmative action pro-
grams-consequently invalidating programs that would have sur-
t B.A., 1989, Dartmouth College; J.D. Candidate 1993, The University of Chicago.
1 488 US 469 (1989).
2 Id at 493-95.
3 Id at 497-511.
4 See Conlin v Blanchard, 890 F2d 811, 816 (6th Cir 1989); Cone Corp. v Hillsborough
County, 908 F2d 908, 913-17 (11th Cir 1990); American Subcontractors Ass'n v City of
Atlanta, 259 Ga 14, 16, 376 SE2d 662, 664 (1989).
5 See Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v Fiedler, 922 F2d 419, 422 (7th Cir 1991)
(dicta), cert denied, 111 S Ct 2261 (1991); Coral Construction Co. v King County, 941 F2d
910, 930-31 (9th Cir 1991), cert denied, 112 S Ct 875 (1992); Clark v Arizona Interscholastic
Ass'n, 886 F2d 1191, 1193-94 (9th Cir 1989); Main Line Paving Co. v Board of Education,
725 F Supp 1349, 1362-63 (E D Pa 1989).
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vived constitutional review under the traditionally less exacting
standard. 6
This Comment examines the propriety of these interpreta-
tions. It addresses two issues: first, whether the intermediate stan-
dard of equal protection review remains appropriate for gender-
specific affirmative action programs enacted by state and local gov-
ernments; and second, assuming this standard remains proper,
whether the exacting factual requirements propounded by Croson
affect the traditional mid-level standard.
Section I provides a thematic discussion of the cases that de-
fine intermediate and strict scrutiny and their application to af-
firmative action programs. It then examines Croson and argues
that the Court announced a change in its conception of the rights
protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Individual rights, irre-
spective of the relative advantage enjoyed by the group from which
a person hails, are now the focus of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Croson is important for a less frequently discussed reason: it was
the first time that a majority of the Court demanded a stiff factual
predicate to justify a racial preference program.
Section II explores the difficulties raised by Croson as it re-
lates to gender-based programs. Part A argues that the intermedi-
ate standard remains appropriate to review affirmative action pro-
grams for women because Croson never addressed gender
classifications or the intermediate standard. The Court's emphasis
on the equal protection of individual rather than class rights re-
quires that all gender classifications, whether invidious or reme-
dial, receive philosophically consistent treatment. One standard,
intermediate scrutiny, must apply to all gender classifications.
Part B of Section II examines the propensity some courts have
shown toward increasing the factual requirements necessary to
support gender-based programs. It argues that grafting a Croson-
style factual requirement onto traditional intermediate scrutiny is
inappropriate because it disingenuously transforms the intermedi-
ate standard into strict scrutiny. The Comment contends that
pragmatic and theoretical concerns require a careful delimitation
between race-specific affirmative action programs, which are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny and a stringent factual predicate, and affirm-
ative action programs that benefit women, which courts must re-
view under the traditional intermediate scrutiny standard without
exigent factual requirements.
6 Lamprecht v FCC, 958 F2d 382, 398 n 9 (DC Cir 1992); Contractors Ass'n of Eastern
Pennsylvania, Inc. v City of Philadelphia, 735 F Supp 1274, 1301-07 (E D Pa 1990).
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I. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
PROGRAMS
The Supreme Court established a three-tiered system of re-
view to ensure the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that "[n]o
State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."' 7 The application of these standards to in-
vidious classifications is undisputed, but affirmative action pro-
grams have created philosophical and practical inconsistencies in
the administration of the Equal Protection Clause. Although the
Court has professed an unwillingness to alter, at least nominally,
the three tiers of scrutiny," the standards continue to evolve. Part
A of this Section examines the intermediate standard of review
and the Court cases that define it.9 Part B provides an overview of
pre-Croson cases that deal with strict scrutiny and racial classifica-
tions. Part C explores Croson, focusing on its theoretical concep-
tion of the rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause.
A. Intermediate Scrutiny and Gender-Based Preference Programs
1. The development of the intermediate standard.
The Court did not always believe that gender classifications
demanded intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause. In Reed v Reed,'0 the Court considered gender discrimina-
tion in the context of an Idaho statute that granted preference to
men over women when both were eligible to administer an estate.
The Court held that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it failed the minimal scrutiny or "rational basis"
test."' This standard, which had been the keystone of equal protec-
tion review since the early 1940s, requires that a classification bear
''a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be
advanced .... ,n2 The Court had been using the minimal scrutiny
standard for all equal protection cases except those that concerned
"US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
8 Croson, 488 US at 518-19 (Kennedy concurring).
' This Section is not an exhaustive analysis of Croson and the cases that preceded it.
For such a review, see Herman Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's
All Over but the Shouting, 86 Mich L Rev 524 (1987); Michael Rosenfeld, Affirmative Ac-
tion and Justice (Yale, 1991); Comment, City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.: Charting a
Course Through the Supreme Court's Affirmative Action Decisions, 17 Hastings Const L Q
699 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action
Cases, 100 Harv L Rev 78 (1986).
10 404 US 71, 72-73 (1971).
1' Id at 76-77.
12 Id at 76.
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race, national origin, or a fundamental constitutional right. Those
classifications demanded strict scrutiny.13
Dissatisfied with the protection accorded women by the ra-
tional basis test but unconvinced that gender classifications were
dangerous enough to warrant strict scrutiny, the Reed Court began
a trend that subtly stiffened minimal scrutiny when reviewing gen-
der classifications, though it claimed to apply the traditional stan-
dard.'4 Then, in Craig v Boren,15 the Court scrapped the pretense
of minimal scrutiny for gender classifications and established an
intermediate standard of review. This two-pronged standard re-
quired that "classifications by gender ... [1] serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and . . . [2] be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."'"
Craig was portentous for another reason: the Court applied
the intermediate standard to a statute that prohibited males under
the age of 21 from drinking beer while it allowed women over 18 to
drink, establishing that men too could be the victims of a discrimi-
natory classification. 7 Intermediate scrutiny thus became relevant
even where the group adversely affected is more powerful, as is the
case when a gender classification is designed to benefit a disadvan-
taged group. The Court confirmed this principle in Orr v Orr,'8 its
first case involving a gender-based preference program. There, it
extended the application of the intermediate scrutiny standard to
strike down several Alabama statutes that imposed alimony re-
quirements on husbands but not wives.' 9
Although these cases strongly suggest that the Court believes
affirmative action programs for women must be reviewed using in-
termediate scrutiny, in Croson's wake courts have split over the
application of strict or intermediate scrutiny to gender-based pro-
grams.2 0 This division hazily reflects perceptions of the Court's am-
bivalence about the multi-tiered system, though the Court's unease
S See McLaughlin v Florida, 379 US 184, 191-92 (1964) (race); Oyama v California,
332 US 633, 646 (1948) (national origin); Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 634 (1969)
(fundamental right).
"' See Schlesinger v Ballard, 419 US 498, 507-10 (1975); Weinberger v Wiesenfeld, 420
US 636, 645-48 (1975); Stanton v Stanton, 421 US 7, 13-17 (1975); Kahn v Shevin, 416 US
351, 353-56 (1974).
-5 429 US 190 (1976).
l Id at 197.
" See id at 199-204.
18 440 US 268 (1979).
19 Id at 279-80.
20 See text accompanying notes 4-6 for a breakdown of the standards of review adopted
by different lower courts.
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stems more from doubts about the three-tiered system as a practi-
cal approach than from the theoretical justification for the inter-
mediate standard.21 Despite the misperceptions, the jurisprudence
is unclouded; the Court's decisions affirm the continued viability of
the intermediate standard.
2. The factual predicate.
If there is a residual dispute over the appropriate standard of
scrutiny, the nature of the factual findings necessary to support a
gender-based classification under either prong of the intermediate
standard is even more ambiguous.22 The Burger Court required an
undemanding factual predicate to justify an "important" govern-
ment objective. "[A]rchaic and overbroad generalizations"-which
meant stereotypes such as women were meant to be house-
wives-could not justify a gender classification. 23 Beyond that, the
factual requirements were largely unspecified. As long as a gender
classification realistically reflected legitimate differences between
the sexes and represented a reasonable means of solving the
targeted problem, it would survive intermediate review.2 4 In partic-
ular, a gender-based preference program would withstand this
scrutiny if implemented as an honest and plausible attempt to re-
duce "the disparity in economic condition between men and
women caused by the long history of discrimination against
women."
25
Subsequently, the Court added a new phrase to the intermedi-
ate scrutiny standard. In Mississippi University for Women v Ho-
21 Justice Rehnquist disparaged the use of three levels of scrutiny. He observed, "I
would think we have had enough difficulty with the two standards of review which our cases
have recognized-the norm of 'rational basis,' and the 'compelling state interest' required
where a 'suspect classification' is involved-so as to counsel weightily against the insertion
of still another 'standard' between those two." Craig, 429 US at 220-21 (Rehnquist dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens argued for a single standard of equal protection review. Id at 212 (Ste-
vens concurring). Justice Marshall expressed an initial reluctance toward the system of
multi-level review; see Massachusetts Board of Retirement v Murgia, 427 US 307, 318-21
(1976) (Marshall dissenting) and Marshall v United States, 414 US 417, 432-33 (1974)
(Marshall dissenting), but subsequently embraced it, Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 231 (1982)
(Marshall concurring).
" The dispute over factual findings also arises in the context of strict scrutiny and
race-specific classifications. See text accompanying notes 35-46.
23 Schlesinger, 419 US at 508.
24 Michael M. v Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 US 464, 468-75 (1981). Similarly,
"substantially related" did not require a showing that no other solution was possible. Id at
473-75.
25 Califano v Webster, 430 US 313, 317 (1977) (upholding a gender-based class-
ification).
1992] 1567
The University of Chicago Law Review
gan,26 Justice O'Connor required that "the party seeking to uphold
a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender
must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justi-
fication' for the classification." Heeding the new phrase but ignor-
ing the fact that the Court did not revise the factual requirements
of the intermediate standard, several courts have demanded in-
creasingly stringent factual demonstrations to support a gender-
based classification-an exacting requirement influenced by the
Court's decisions in cases concerning race but unjustified by the
law concerning gender. Although the standard remains loosely
defined, the principles are straightforward: the factual requirement
must be less stringent for intermediate than for strict scrutiny.
B. Strict Scrutiny and Race-Specific Preference Programs
1. The application of strict scrutiny to a remedial
classification.
Recent equal protection doctrine for affirmative action cases
has evolved almost exclusively in the area of race-specific pro-
grams. These cases, all plurality opinions, have applied strict scru-
tiny to racial preference programs enacted by State or local gov-
ernment, and they have unjustifiably influenced the equal
protection review of affirmative action programs for women.
University of California Regents v Bakke2 s signalled the cur-
rent era of affirmative action jurisprudence. A medical school
adopted an admissions policy that accorded sixteen spots to minor-
ity applicants in each entering class of one hundred students. 29
Five justices held the policy invalid, but four found that the plan
violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and did not con-
sider the constitutional issue.30 Only the fifth, Justice Powell,
stated that the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.3 1 He
wrote that all classifications by race, whether intended to help or
harm, were subject to strict scrutiny.32
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and
White, dissented from Powell's conclusion that strict scrutiny was
appropriate to judge racial and ethnic distinctions regardless of the
26 458 US 718, 724 (1982). See also Kirchberg v Feenstra, 450 US 455, 461 (1981).
2 See Section II.B.
28 438 US 265 (1978).
29 Id at 275 (Powell writing separately).
'0 Id at 421 (Stevens concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
1 Id at 320 (Powell writing separately).
32 Id at 291.
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purpose behind the classification.33 These justices would apply a
less stringent standard-intermediate scrutiny-if the purpose of
the classification were remedial.3 4
2. The factual predicate for strict scrutiny.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Bakke prefaced the
controversy over the factual predicate necessary to sustain an af-
firmative action program.3 5 Affirmative action programs, Brennan
argued, may be justified by broad historical discrimination and sta-
tistics drawn from the country as a whole.3 6 Justice Powell dis-
agreed, stating that strict judicial, legislative, or administrative
findings of constitutional or statutory violations must exist.3 7 He
acknowledged that diversity was a "compelling" interest of an ad-
missions program, 38 but nevertheless concluded that an admissions
committee may treat race as only one factor in a variegated set of
qualifications and not as a basis for entry into a set-aside program
that reserves admission places for racial minorities.39
The Court in Wygant v Jackson Board of Education0 held
unconstitutional an affirmative action program that favored minor-
ities when employees were being dismissed. Justice Powell, writing
for the plurality, stated that any racial classification, benign or in-
vidious, was inherently suspect and must survive strict scrutiny."1
Justice Powell required that the program remedy specific instances
of discrimination. Broad societal discrimination could not justify a
state or local affirmative action program.12 The plurality derided
historical grievances, held sufficient to justify gender-based affirm-
Id at 357-59 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
31 Id at 359-62.
I" This dispute had already surfaced in the context of intermediate scrutiny and gen-
der-based classifications. See text accompanying notes 22-29.
"' Bakke, 438 US at 369-73 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Statistics such as "the gap between the pro-
portion of Negroes in medicine and their proportion in the population" should be sufficient
to justify a racial classification. Id at 370.
', Id at 307-09 (Powell writing separately).
3' Id at 315.
" Id at 318-19. Justice Powell's proposal for an admissions policy that includes race as
one of many factors may not be practicable, for when an admissions officer considers race,
she might effectively intend to admit a certain number of minority applicants, weighting
race heavily in their favor. Once that number of minorities has been admitted, race may
diminish as a factor that increases a candidate's chances for admission.
40 476 US 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
41 Id at 273.
42 Id at 276.
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ative action programs, as too abstract to support race-specific
programs.43
Justice O'Connor wrote a portentous concurrence acknowledg-
ing that strict scrutiny was the proper standard to review benign
racial classifications,44 but advocating a relaxation of the Court's
previous requirement that the governmental body make specific
findings of discrimination. She demanded only substantial evi-
dence of discrimination because, among other consequences, spe-
cific findings might subject the government to liability, and there-
fore deter public employers from enacting affirmative action
programs altogether." Justice O'Connor's opinion hinged on her
belief that the layoff provision was not narrowly tailored to achieve
its remedial purpose."
3. The distinction between congressional and local affirma-
tive action programs.
The Court gives much greater deference to congressional af-
firmative action programs than to those enacted by state and local
governments. In Fullilove v Klutznick,47 the Court upheld a fed-
eral public works program that granted a ten percent set-aside for
minority contractors. Although it did not state which standard of
review it was applying, the Court acknowledged that where Con-
gress rather than local government acts to redress discrimination,
it will not critically review the factual record for specific instances
of past discrimination." Consequently, the Court will allow Con-
gress to enact a broader, more diffused affirmative action pro-
gram.4 9 Congress, unlike local governments, has broad remedial
powers. With minimal judicial interference, it may interpret facts,
make assumptions, and act on them.
A decade later, the Court again demonstrated this deference
by applying intermediate scrutiny to a federal race-specific affirm-
" See id at 274-78.
" Id at 284-86 (O'Connor concurring).
"I See id at 290-91 (O'Connor concurring). If the government must admit guilt for dis-
criminating against specific individuals or companies, those victims will file lawsuits re-
questing damages. See Sullivan, 100 Harv L Rev at 92 (cited in note 9).
4 476 US at 294 (O'Connor concurring).
47 448 US 448, 492 (1980).
" Id at 472 ("we . . . approach our task with appropriate deference to the Con-
gress . . ."); id at 485 ("it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that in
the past some nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over the years
from the virtual exclusion of minority firms from these contracting opportunities").
" See id at 472.
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ative action program.50 In Metro Broadcasting v FCC, Justice
Brennan wrote that "race-conscious classifications adopted by
Congress are subject to a different standard than such classifica-
tions prescribed by state and local governments." 5' 1 With the resig-
nation of Justice Brennan, and the fact that in dissent Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ken-
nedy and Scalia, believed that strict scrutiny should apply to all
racial classifications, it is unlikely that the Court will continue to
apply a lower standard of review to congressional classifications.
More likely, the Court will show deference to Congress by an un-
critical review of the congressional findings of fact.
C. City of Richmond v J. A. Croson Co.: Reimagining Affirmative
Action
Croson made two important modifications to equal protection
doctrine. It mandated that the consistent protection of individual
rights requires the application of strict scrutiny to any racial classi-
fication, regardless of the legislation's purpose. It also reiterated,
for the first time by a majority, the exacting factual predicate ne-
cessary to justify any racial classification.
The Richmond City Council, which was more than one-half
black, passed a Minority Business Utilization Plan that required
prime contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcon-
tract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of each contract
to one or more "Minority Business Enterprises"
(MBEs)-companies of which at least fifty-one percent is owned
by minorities.52 The Council defined minorities as "[c]itizens of the
United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indi-
ans, Eskimos, or Aleuts."53 The plan did not limit the area from
which a minority-owned business could apply; apparently, a minor-
ity business from hundreds of miles away, where it endured no dis-
crimination, could apply for a Richmond city contract and benefit
from the affirmative action program." The Council meant the
Richmond plan to be "remedial" and enacted it "for the purpose of
promoting wider participation by minority business enterprises in
the construction of public projects."5 The Court applied strict
50 Metro Broadcasting v FCC, 110 S Ct 2997, 3026 (1990).
51 Id at 3009.
51 City of Richmond v J.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469, 477-78 (1989).
53 Id at 478.
"Id.
55 Id, quoting Richmond, Va City Code § 12-158(a) (1985).
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scrutiny and required an exacting factual predicate.56 It held the
plan unconstitutional.
1. Strict scrutiny of a racial preference program.
The Court invoked strict scrutiny to review a locally-enacted
benign racial classification because it reconceived the rights guar-
anteed by the Equal Protection Clause.17 The opinion stressed that
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees individual rights.5 8 It
makes no qualifying reference to class, race or gender. Justice
O'Connor specifically agreed with the view of Justice Powell in
Bakke that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one
thing when applied to one individual and something else when ap-
plied to a person of another color."59 Justice Scalia went further.
In his concurrence he stated flatly that "[o]ur Constitution is col-
orblind";60 whatever a person's race, she has "a constitutional
right" to be considered on "[her] individual merits in a racially
neutral manner."6 ' This, Justice Scalia exhorted, is a fundamental
"American principle" from which the Court must no longer
depart.2
The Court applied strict scrutiny to a race-based affirmative
action program not merely because it had become increasingly mis-
trustful of the uses of affirmative action programs, but because it
had developed a conception of the Equal Protection Clause pre-
mised on the guarantee of individual rights. There is, then, a
strong majority on the Court that believes that classifications,
whether invidious or benign, must be judged consistently.6
66 Id at 493-511.
"' Id at 493-95. The Court was also motivated by skepticism concerning the benevo-
lence of affirmative action in all cases. Id at 493-94.
"8 Id at 493. When Justice Marshall disparaged the majority opinion as a "deliberate
and giant step backward in this Court's affirmative action jurisprudence," id at 529 (Mar-
shall dissenting), an indication that the Court "regard[ed] racial discrimination as largely a
phenomenon of the past," id at 552, he was essentially objecting to the dismissal of a collec-
tive conception of equal rights.
"' Id at 494, quoting Bakke, 438 US at 289-90.
Go Id at 521 (Scalia concurring), quoting Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537, 559 (1896).
1 Id at 527, quoting DeFunis v Odegaard, 416 US 312, 337 (1974) (Douglas dissenting).
62 Id.
'3 Justice O'Connor ended the majority opinion by noting the difficulty of determining
whether a classification was benign or discriminatory. Id at 510-11. The Richmond program,
she suggested, may not be affirmative action at all: Richmond's population was fifty percent
black, and its City Council consisted of nine seats, five held by blacks. Id at 495. Here a
majority group passed a statute to advantage itself and did not, as in the usual case of
affirmative action, establish a program to its own disadvantage. Id at 495-96.
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2. The factual predicate.
The decision to apply strict scrutiny was attacked as a sign
that the Court was no longer concerned with civil rights and, im-
plicitly, equality beyond a theoretical and detached level." The
preoccupation with strict scrutiny, however, ignores another aspect
of the decision that also compromised the viability of affirmative
action programs. The Court demanded comprehensive documenta-
tion of specific instances of past discrimination to justify a reme-
dial preference program.6 5 It held that the purpose of a race-based
classification could be compelling only if it were supported by a
convincing array of specific facts."6 Even if the interest were com-
pelling, the classification must be narrowly tailored to be specifi-
cally remedial.6 7
Although the Court has never allowed past societal discrimina-
tion to validate race-specific affirmative action by a state or local
government, Croson further limited the proof acceptable to justify
a remedial program reviewed under strict scrutiny. A comparison
between the number of prime contracts awarded to minority firms
and the minority population in Richmond was insufficient, for it
did not establish that minority-owned subcontractors had been
discriminated against.68 Justice O'Connor mused that "[b]lacks
may be disproportionately attracted to industries other than con-
struction."6 9 No direct evidence indicated that Richmond had dis-
criminated along racial lines in awarding contracts or that prime
contractors had discriminated against minority subcontractors.7 0
In order to establish a compelling government interest, Rich-
mond had to prove that the city itself had engaged in discrimina-
tory practices,7' or that "contractors were systematically excluding
minority businesses from subcontracting opportunities. '7 2 Minor-
ity subcontractors, and not blacks in the population at large, must
be the direct victims of discrimination by Richmond's construction
64 Croson, 488 US at 539-40 (Marshall dissenting).
65 The Court retained the distinction between affirmative action programs created by
Congress and those created by local governments. Although Congress "need not make spe-
cific findings of discrimination to engage in race-conscious relief," Richmond must. Id at
489-91.
66 Id at 505.
67 Id at 507-08.
68 Id at 501.
69 Id at 503.
70 Id at 480.
71 Id at 510.
72 Id at 509.
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contracts division. As the Court admitted, a closely-tailored racial
preference was warranted only in an "extreme case." 73 Extreme
cases, however, would essentially be personal ones, where a specific
individual or business could prove aiscrimination against her or
the firm. 4
The second aspect of the factual requirement in Croson con-
cerned the scope of the statute: whether it was narrowly tailored to
redress a specific past wrong.1 5 Justice O'Connor held that the
Richmond plan was not tailored narrowly enough to further its
purpose-even if that purpose had been compelling-because
Richmond had failed to consider "the use of race-neutral means to
increase minority business participation in city contracting. '76 A
strict racial quota must be a final attempt to redress a recalcitrant
situation; the government must have attempted or at least seri-
ously considered other solutions."1 The thirty percent figure was
not tailored "to any goal, except perhaps outright racial balanc-
ing."'78 Since the Richmond program included in its definition of a
"Minority-Owned Business" those owned by Eskimo or Aleut citi-
zens-groups not represented in Richmond-the statute could not
have been founded on adequate evidence of discrimination in the
Richmond construction market. 9
Justice Marshall did not merely disagree with the decision to
apply strict scrutiny; he realized that the Court also demanded a
new factual predicate that would be extremely difficult for any af-
firmative action program to satisfy. He stated that Richmond had
compiled sufficient evidence to justify the set-aside program under
either intermediate or strict scrutiny, and that the city was not re-
lying on abstract societal discrimination. Justice Marshall argued
that "to suggest that the facts on which Richmond has relied do
not provide a sound basis for its finding of past racial discrimina-
tion simply blinks credibility."'"
After Croson and its predecessors, then, a remedial racial clas-
sification will.survive strict review only if the government entity
granting the preference previously discriminated in the relevant in-
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See id at 507-08.
76 Id at 507.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id at 506.
80 See id at 539-41 (Marshall dissenting).
81 Id at 541.
1574 [59:1563
Affirmative Action Programs
dustry against the minority group whose members will benefit.
Further, the program must be narrowly tailored to advantage only
those who actually suffered the discrimination. Proving that the
government routinely and deliberately discriminated against cer-
tain people is extremely difficult. Designing a preference program
that targets only those who suffered may be impossible.
II. INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AFTER CROSON
The Court's opinion in Croson was its most decisive concern-
ing affirmative action in a decade, yet this unflinching boldness si-
multaneously concerned commentators and confused lower
courts.2 Several courts have interpreted Croson to require strict
scrutiny for the review of any affirmative action program, regard-
less of the beneficiary.8 3 Others continue to use the intermediate
standard to review gender-based classifications. " In Contractors
Ass'n of Eastern Pa., Inc. v City of Philadelphia,"5 the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania thoughtfully considered whether to apply
strict or intermediate scrutiny to a gender-based preference pro-
gram. A review of that opinion provides an introduction to the dis-
pute. There the court addressed a city ordinance that set aside a
percentage of city contracts for minority- and female-owned busi-
nesses.8 6 Among the stated reasons for the legislation was "[a] pat-
tern of past and present racial, sexual and economic discrimina-
tion" in Philadelphia's municipal contracting system.87 The court
cited Croson and properly applied strict scrutiny to the provisions
that favored minority-owned businesses.88
The district court then noted that the Supreme Court has long
established that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for all gender
classifications, whether invidious or benign, and it applied interme-
82 Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 98 Yale L J 1711 (1989).
8I See Conlin v Blanchard, 890 F2d 811, 816 (6th Cir 1989); Cone Corp. v Hillsborough
County, 908 F2d 908, 913-17 (11th Cir 1990); American Subcontractors Ass'n v City of
Atlanta, 259 Ga 14, 16, 376 SE2d 662, 664 (1989).
84 See Lamprecht v FCC, 958 F2d 382, 398 n 9 (DC Cir 1992); Coral Construction Co. v
King County, 941 F2d 910, 930-31 (9th Cir 1991); Clark v Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n,
886 F2d 1191, 1193-94 (9th Cir 1989); Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa., Inc. v City of Phil-
adelphia, 735 F Supp 1274, 1301-07 (E D Pa 1990). See also Michigan Road Builders Ass'n,
Inc. v Milliken, 834 F2d 583, 595 (6th Cir 1987), aff'd mem, 489 US 1061 (1989) (decided
before Croson, but affirmed by the Supreme Court after Croson).
8" 735 F Supp 1274 (E D Pa 1990).
8 Id at 1278.
87 Id.
8 Id at 1294-99.
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diate scrutiny to the provisions advantaging female-owned busi-
nesses. 9 For support, the court cited Michigan Road Builders
Ass'n, Inc. v Milliken,9 which applied intermediate scrutiny to a
Michigan law favoring female-owned businesses.91
In reaching its decision, the Contractors Ass'n court reviewed
the issues involved in the choice between strict and intermediate
scrutiny for gender-based preference programs. First, it suggested
that Croson may signal a grave skepticism of all affirmative action,
a conclusion that would require all classifications for preference
programs to receive strict scrutiny.92 Second, the court briefly
noted Justice Stevens's concern that the legislative system should
not be used to punish the past conduct of private citizens, since
that was the province of the judiciary.9 3
Finally, the use of intermediate scrutiny for gender classifica-
tions and strict scrutiny for racial classifications may create an
anomalous result in the context of affirmative action. It would be-
come easier to enact a program that advantages women than one
that aids racial minorities. This would seem contrary to the struc-
ture of the three-tiered system of equal protection review. The
graduated standards usually accord minorities greater protection
by making it more difficult to enact racial rather than gender
classifications.94
89 Id at 1299-1307.
90 834 F2d 583 (6th Cir 1987), aff'd mem, 489 US 1061 (1989) (decided before Croson,
but affirmed after Croson).
91 735 F Supp at 1301.
92 Id at 1303. The court also noted that the three-tiered system itself was problematic
and is frequently disparaged by both justices and commentators. Id. The observation is a
valid one, but because the three-tiered structure remains the law, its validity is outside the
scope of this comment.
11 Id at 1302, citing Croson, 488 US at 513-14 (Stevens concurring). Justice Stevens has
carved out his own position concerning equal protection analysis, one that essentially ap-
plies a single standard of review. See Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens
concurring). The court in Contractors Ass'n noted that Justice Stevens's anxieties about the
proper role of the remedial power of the legislative system are "even more pronounced
where the level of review of that power is the lesser standard of intermediate scrutiny." 735
F Supp at 1302. Although circumspection may be justified whenever a legislative body at-
tempts to redress discrimination by penalizing another group, the fact that the judicial sys-
tem uses intermediate rather than strict scrutiny to review that attempt does not indicate
that there is a greater danger of legislative abuse; rather, it is evidence that the judicial
system has long believed that the legislative action taken-a gender rather than a racial
classification-is less dangerous than the action reviewed in Croson. Stevens's concerns are
mitigated and not enhanced when the subject is gender. Intermediate scrutiny does not
make abuse more likely; it recalibrates what the judicial system will consider abuse.
94 Contractor's Ass'n, 735 F Supp at 1302-03.
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Part A of this Section addresses the choice between intermedi-
ate and strict scrutiny and asserts that invoking strict scrutiny for
gender-based programs is both unprecedented and inconsistent
with the reasoning in Croson. Subsection 1 argues that the Court
has replaced a conception of the Fourteenth Amendment as pro-
viding for the equal protection of rights inseparable from class
with a guarantee of individual rights dissociated from a collective
context. The Court's demand for philosophical consistency con-
cerning individual rights requires the application of one standard
to judge each type of classification. Intermediate scrutiny is there-
fore appropriate for all gender classifications, whether invidious or
benign.
Subsection 2 notes that this reevaluation allays concerns about
the apparently anomalous result of the greater ease of sustaining
gender- rather than race-specific programs. The result is only
anomalous if the protected rights are seen as collective rather than
individual. The anomalous result problem is essentially viewpoint-
based; it disappears under the individual conception of equal
rights. Subsection 3 reexamines the Brennan-Marshall position. It
argues that any departure from intermediate scrutiny in the review
of gender-based affirmative action programs should be toward a
less exacting standard-minimal scrutiny-and certainly never
strict scrutiny. Subsection 4 considers statutes that make both
gender and racial classifications. Some courts have applied strict
scrutiny, without distinguishing between provisions that make dif-
ferent classifications. That approach is improper. Intermediate
scrutiny should be invoked to review the parts of the statute that
make gender classifications; strict scrutiny for those provisions
that make racial classifications. Finally, subsection 5 argues that
where Congress rather than local government enacts a gender-
based affirmative action program, a more lenient review is
appropriate.
The court in Contractors Ass'n went on to discuss the exact-
ing factual predicate that Croson established and its potential ap-
plication to intermediate scrutiny. It concluded that the Croson-
style factual predicate was applicable to the intermediate stan-
dard. 5 Part B examines this approach and argues that transposing
a Croson-style factual predicate is both improper and misguided
because it disingenuously transforms the intermediate standard
"I See id at 1304.
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into strict scrutiny, a standard the Court has never applied to a
gender classification.
A. The Choice Between Intermediate and Strict Scrutiny
1. The consistent treatment of individual rights.
The emphasis on individual rather than collective rights re-
confirms the Court's earlier decisions in the area of gender-specific
affirmative action programs."6 Men and women enjoy rights predi-
cated on their status as individuals rather than their gender. The
protection of individual rights demands consistent treatment re-
gardless of the purpose of the legislation or the privileged position
of the group disadvantaged by the classification. 7 Courts must
therefore judge all gender classifications using a single stan-
dard-intermediate scrutiny. The alternative, applying strict scru-
tiny to remedial gender classifications and intermediate scrutiny to
other gender classifications, arrantly violates the individual rights
conception of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Contractors Ass'n court believed that unless the applica-
tion of strict scrutiny to gender classifications represents repeated
instances of careless jurisprudence, it must be premised upon the
belief that Croson sent "a powerful message that affirmative action
and quotas are highly suspect."' 8 If the Supreme Court has devel-
oped a grave skepticism toward affirmative action, the argument
continues, then strict scrutiny is the better standard of review re-
gardless of the nature of the classification.
This position misinterprets both the reasoning behind recent
Court decisions and the philosophy that historically informed
equal protection review and engendered the three-tiered approach.
Although it is true that the conservative majority on the current
Court is less willing to advance the cause of affirmative action, the
Court applied strict scrutiny to a race-based affirmative action pro-
gram in Croson because it had developed a conception of the Equal
Protection Clause premised on the guarantee of individual and not
96 See text accompanying notes 17-19. Compare Croson, 488 US at 493-94 (applying
conception of Fourteenth Amendment rights as individual rights to race-based affirmative
action) with Orr v Orr, 440 US 268, 279-82 (1979) (individualized hearings required to deter-
mine whether spouse is "needy" under alimony statute only because hearing system already
established for other purposes); Califano v Webster, 430 US 313, 317-18 (1977) (general
societal disparity between earnings by men and earnings by women sufficient to support
Social Security Act provision granting women higher retirement benefits).
"I See Section I.C.1.
91 Contractors Ass'n, 735 F Supp at 1303.
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collective rights.99 Justice O'Connor expressly agreed with the view
of Justice Powell in Bakke that "[t]he guarantee of equal protec-
tion cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and
something else when applied to a person of another color."100
The same reasoning must apply to gender classifications. If a
gender distinction is made, a single standard must be invoked re-
gardless of the advantaged group. The intermediate standard re-
mains proper. Nothing in Croson suggests that the Court intended
to dismantle the intermediate standard of equal protection re-
view-a view implicit in any decision to invoke strict scrutiny for
gender classifications. As the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
noted, "[t]he Croson opinion gives no indication that the strict
scrutiny analysis applied to remedial race- and ethnicity-based
classifications was intended to be applied to other remedial forms
of classification." 101
If this were intended, gender classifications would require a
uniquely inconsistent approach, one that demanded strict scrutiny
for gender classifications used to support preference programs and
intermediate scrutiny to review all other gender classifications.
This is a particularly incoherent position because it makes invidi-
ous gender classifications easier to enact than benign gender classi-
fications. The alternative, that the Court in Croson intended to de-
stroy intermediate scrutiny and review all classifications under the
strict standard, is indefensible: intermediate scrutiny is never men-
tioned in the decision. That several justices once expressed distrust
of intermediate scrutiny when the Court first expounded the stan-
dard reveals an initial discomfort with the expansion of the tiered
structure of equal protection review rather than a specific criticism
of the intermediate standard. 02 There is depth to its entrench-
ment: courts have consistently reapplied the intermediate standard
in the nearly two decades since its inception.10 3
Croson's siren is not that affirmative action programs are no
longer acceptable, but that philosophical consistency concerning
individual rights is fundamental to equal protection. The opinion
reaffirms and does not dismantle intermediate scrutiny.
See Section I.C.1.
100 Croson, 488 US at 494, quoting Bakke, 438 US at 289-90.
101 Contractors Ass'n, 735 F Supp at 1300.
'0' See note 21.
103 Califano, 430 US at 316-17; Michael M. v Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 US
464, 468-69 (1981); Schlesinger v Ballard, 419 US 498, 506-10 (1975).
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2. The anomalous result problem.
If a court applies intermediate scrutiny to gender-based af-
firmative action programs and strict scrutiny to race-specific pref-
erence programs, it becomes easier to enact affirmative action pro-
grams beneficial to women than to enact similar legislation for
minorities. This result only appears anomalous if the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees class and not individual rights. If the
Equal Protection Clause protects collective rights, then the differ-
ing standards are meant to grant varying protection to groups ac-
cording to their own inability to protect themselves. Consequently,
it seems strange that it should be easier to aid women than racial
minority groups because the latter warrants greater protection
against invidious classifications through strict scrutiny.
This view of the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is inconsonant with the Court's prevailing conception of the
Equal Protection Clause. 10 The distinction between strict and in-
termediate scrutiny does not mean that minorities warrant more
protection than women, but that a race-based classification itself is
more dangerous. The three-tiered system does not imply that
women need less protection than minority groups, but that gender
classifications are more likely to serve a beneficial purpose, and are
less likely to endanger constitutional rights.
Members of different races share biological features that give
them inherently equal capabilities, so a classification that grants
preference to one group over another must be arbitrary. The Court
noted that "[b] ecause racial characteristics so seldom provide a rel-
evant basis for disparate treatment, and because classifications
based on race are potentially so harmful to the entire body politic,
it is especially important that the reasons for any such classifica-
tion be clearly identified and unquestionably legitimate."' 5 Strict
scrutiny provides this protection.
Gender classifications are less suspect because legitimate bio-
logical differences exist between men and women that may warrant
different treatment under law.'06 It is not anomalous to allow a
government entity to legislate concerning gender because undenia-
104 See Section I.C.1.
"I Croson, 488 US at 505, quoting Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448, 533-35 (1980)
(Stevens dissenting).
106 Feminist theorists have spent much of the past two decades debating this position.
Recently, relational theorists, notably Carol Gilligan, have argued that men and women dif-
fer both biologically and in their moral referents. See generally, Carol Gilligan, In a Differ-
ent Voice (Harvard, 1987).
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ble differences between men and women may more frequently jus-
tify disparate treatment. The three-tiered system balances the na-
ture of the distinction and the treatment accorded those on either
side of the classification. Any perceived facial anomaly resulting
from the stronger status of gender rather than racial preference
programs is the result of a class-based conception of the Equal
Protection Clause-a conception the Court rejects.
3. The significance of the Brennan-Marshall position on gen-
der classifications.
Justices Brennan and Marshall have long supported the use of
a less stringent standard of review for benign classifications. 107
Their position is founded on the belief that the equal protection of
individual rights dissociated from the collective context is an ab-
stract and unrealistic theory. They would review such a classifica-
tion under intermediate and not strict scrutiny.
If the Equal Protection Clause protects collective rights, the
risks posed by a classification that aids a disadvantaged group are
not problematic. A classification that aids a member of a disadvan-
taged group at the expense of an individual from a generally privi-
leged group promotes, rather than damages, equal rights. If the
Brennan-Marshall position is correct, gender classifications for
preference programs should be subject to minimal rather than in-
termediate scrutiny-and certainly never strict scrutiny-because
they are benign. 08 If the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees indi-
vidual rights, however, Justice Brennan's view is unwarranted.
Under the individual rights conception there are no benign classifi-
cations-they all offend equal protection.
Ironically, with the individual rights perspective ascendant,
the Brennan-Marshall position has undermined the justification
for the intermediate scrutiny standard. The Court developed the
intermediate standard exclusively for gender classifications, and it
was appropriate for all gender classifications, regardless of purpose.
By invoking intermediate scrutiny for classifications other than
gender, Justices Brennan and Marshall engendered the argument
107 Croson, 488 US at 535-36 (Marshall dissenting); Wygant v Jackson Board of Educa-
tion, 476 US 267, 301-02 (1986) (Marshall dissenting); University of California Regents v
Bakke, 438 US 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Fullilove, 448 US at 517-19 (Marshall concurring
in the judgment).
108 See Bakke, 438 US at 358-59 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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that the standards' are inherently fungible, and that the purpose of
the legislation was relevant. That view allowed judges who were
disinclined to accept affirmative action to disregard the well-set-
tled rule that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate for all gender
classifications, strict scrutiny for all racial classifications. But the
substitution of a conception of individual rights for a conception of
class rights does not imply that gender classifications deserve strict
scrutiny. It means that a classification, whether benign or invidi-
ous, should be subject to the same standard.
Even if the individual rights conception were not ascendant,
the result would not be anomalous. Justice O'Connor noted that
while affirmative action programs are usually enacted by a domi-
nant group to its own disadvantage, that was not the case in Rich-
mond, where five of the nine city council members and half of the
city population was black.10 9 While many large cities with signifi-
cant minority populations have black mayors and council mem-
bers, women have been less successful in achieving representation.
It is not anomalous, then, to make gender-based programs easier to
sustain than race-specific ones.
4. Statutes that make both gender and racial classifications.
Statutes that create both race- and gender-based preference
programs have confused several courts. These courts have applied
strict scrutiny to the entire statute without distinguishing between
the different provisions. 110 The correct approach, and one appar-
ently endorsed by the Supreme Court, is to apply strict scrutiny to
the racial provisions and intermediate scrutiny to the gender
classifications.
In American Subcontractors Ass'n v City of Atlanta,"" the
Supreme Court of Georgia used strict scrutiny to invalidate a mu-
nicipal program favoring both female- and minority-owned busi-
nesses. The Georgia court did not distinguish between the part of
the, statute that made a gender classification and that which
adopted a racial preference." 2 Similarly, in Conlin v Blanchard,11 3
the court cited the strict standard of review and factual predicate
109 Croson, 488 US at 495.
110 See American Subcontractors Ass'n v City of Atlanta, 259 Ga 14, 16, 376 SE2d 662,
664 (1989); Conlin v Blanchard, 890 F2d 811, 816 (6th Cir 1989); Barhold v Rodriguez 863
F2d 233, 236-38 (2d Cir 1988).
"1 376 SE2d at 664-67.
.1. Id. The Second Circuit in Barhold v Rodriguez also failed to make this distinction.
863 F2d at 238.
"' 890 F2d 811, 816 (6th Cir 1989).
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expounded in Wygant as the threshold that must be met "[i]n or-
der for a race or sex based remedial measure to withstand scrutiny
under the fourteenth amendment." The court in Conlin failed to
justify its apparent adoption of strict scrutiny for gender-based
preferences.114
To utilize a single standard to review a statute that makes
classifications by both gender and race, rather than applying strict
scrutiny to racial classifications and intermediate scrutiny to gen-
der classifications, is to find guilt by association. The three-tiered
system of equal protection review was developed to provide a more
flexible approach to reviewing classifications that demanded dis-
similar treatment. The fact that one statute makes two classifica-
tions should not pervert equal protection doctrine. Courts should
invoke both the intermediate and strict standards to review the
respective provisions that classify according to gender and race.
In Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v Milliken,"5 the Sixth
Circuit did just that. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the
Sixth Circuit's decision,"8 implicitly endorsing the application of
both intermediate and strict scrutiny to remedial statutes that
make both gender and racial classifications.
5. The distinction between congressional and local affirma-
tive action programs.
If Congress rather than local government enacts a gender-
based preference program, then the argument for intermediate
scrutiny is even more compelling. In Metro Broadcasting v FCC,'"
the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to a federal race-specific
remedial classification. If Congress were to enact a gender-based
affirmative action program, the Metro Broadcasting approach
would require a court to apply the rational basis test, rather than
intermediate scrutiny. The least appropriate approach would be to
apply strict scrutiny to a federal gender-based affirmative action
program.
After the triumph of the individual rights conception of the
Equal Protection Clause, and the subsequent resignation of Justice
Brennan, however, it seems unlikely that the Metro Broadcasting
14 Id at 816-17.
115 834 F2d 583 (6th Cir 1987), aff'd mem, 489 US 1061 (1989) (decided before Croson,
but affirmed after Croson).
'16 489 US 1061 (1989). Ironically, the Sixth Circuit may have subsequently abandoned
the intermediate standard in Conlin, 890 F2d at 816.
11 110 S Ct 2997, 3008-09 (1990).
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approach will survive long."" The Court will probably subject all
classifications to the same standard of review. The deference to-
ward congressional programs will continue, but it will take the
form of a less critical review of the factual showing provided by
Congress. A court would invoke intermediate scrutiny for a gender
classification, strict scrutiny for a racial classification, but defer,
without skeptical reappraisal, to congressional findings of fact.
B. Strict Scrutiny By Any Other Name: A Croson-Style Factual
Requirement Is Inappropriate for Intermediate Scrutiny
As the previous Section demonstrates, intermediate scrutiny
remains the proper standard of review for gender-based classifica-
tions. Unfortunately, courts have used the standard imprecisely.
Some courts have nominally applied intermediate scrutiny but ap-
pended a Croson-style factual requirement." 9 This approach is
misguided. The distinction between a "compelling" governmental
interest and an "important" one is not factual, but theoretical.
Coupling a Croson-style factual requirement with intermediate
scrutiny disingenuously transforms it into strict scrutiny.
Croson reiterated that to survive strict scrutiny, a party must
demonstrate specific instances of past discrimination by the gov-
ernmental agency.11° The opinion did not revise the factual predi-
cate required to justify gender-based affirmative action programs.
Nowhere in the opinion does the Court make a broad statement
concerning factual requirements for all affirmative action
programs..
In Contractors Ass'n, the district court tried to balance an ex-
acting requirement for specific evidence that it incorrectly believed
Croson demanded for all affirmative action programs with the
more lenient standard of intermediate scrutiny that it rightly de-
cided to apply.'2 ' The court wrote that "the philosophy embraced
by the Croson Court strongly suggests that the Supreme Court's
view is that any remedial classification, not simply race- or ethnic-
I's See text accompanying notes 47-51.
119 See, for example, Contractors Ass'n, 735 F Supp at 1301-07.
120 See text accompanying notes 65-74.
121 Contractors Ass'n, 735 F Supp at 1303 ("Although in Croson this requirement [of
specific evidence] was expressed as the 'compelling state interest' prong of the strict scru-
tiny standard used to evaluate an MBE, this court feels the specific evidence requirement
cannot be ignored even in the evaluation of an FBE [Female-Owned Business
Enterprise] . . ").
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ity-based, must be tied to specific discrimination by the acting gov-
ernmental entity.'1122
The opinion in Contractors Ass'n inevitably revealed the im-
propriety of appending a stringent factual predicate to intermedi-
ate scrutiny. The court noted that the "evidentiary burden will be
greater or lesser depending on the level of scrutiny applied,' 123 but
it did not explain how to accord a practicable graduation to spe-
cific evidence of governmental discrimination. The court candidly
acknowledged that "the result of bearing in mind the need for spe-
cific evidence while conducting examinations of the FBE under the
intermediate scrutiny test ... is that the analysis begins to take on
the appearance of strict scrutiny.' '1 24
Without resolving these concerns, the court in Contractors
Ass'n looked to the legislative history of the Philadelphia set-aside
ordinance and dismissed as mere "scattershot numbers" the evi-
dence that despite the presence of 4,365 women business owners in
Philadelphia, less than one-half of one percent of all city contracts
went to woman-owned businesses.' 25 These statistics were "not a
substitute for evidence of discrimination against women. "126 What
the court wanted was legislative findings specifying the discrimina-
tory practices of the Philadelphia contract procurement process. 2 '
Finding none, it abrogated the affirmative action program.128 Al-
though the court said it did not require "glaring evidence" of spe-
cific discrimination, it obviously wanted enough to make it
squint.129
The District of Columbia Circuit, with Justice Thomas re-
turning to decide a case in which he had heard oral arguments,
made a similar error. In Lamprecht v FCC,130 the appellate court
applied intermediate scrutiny to a congressionally-approved reme-
dial gender classification, and struck it down. Justice Thomas cor-
rectly required that evidence of past discrimination be founded on
something other than sexual stereotypes.' 3' But he improperly re-
quired much more. He skeptically reviewed congress-
122 Id at 1304.
123 Id.
124 Id at 1303.
... Id at 1305.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 958 F2d 382, 391-98 (DC Cir 1992).
131 Id at 392-95. See also Section I.A.2.
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ionally-approved evidentiary studies that demonstrated that
women were the victims of discrimination in broadcast licensing,
and he questioned Congress's judgment that favoring women
would further its stated goal of diversity in the broadcast indus-
try.13 2 In demanding a stringent factual showing of past discrimi-
nation, which he called "meaningful" evidence, 13 3 Justice Thomas
not only effectively applied strict scrutiny to a gender classifica-
tion, but he ignored Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting, which re-
quired great deference to congressional findings of fact. Croson ex-
plicitly endorsed judicial deference to congressional findings and
assumptions. Justice O'Connor wrote that Congress "need not
make specific findings of discrimination to engage in race-conscious
relief."'31 4 When Congress rather than a local government enacts a
gender-based affirmative action program, courts must accept a
more lenient factual predicate.
Coupling a strict factual predicate with intermediate scrutiny
ignores precedent. The Supreme Court has consistently required a
less demanding factual predicate to justify gender-based programs.
As long as the classification does not depend on sexual stereotypes,
redressing the effects of past discrimination qualifies as an impor-
tant government interest.13 To satisfy strict scrutiny, in contrast,
a classification must be narrowly tailored to redress the victims of
a specific past wrong by the government. 36
Although the factual predicate for intermediate scrutiny is not
closely defined, the Court has established a distinction between the
factual requirements of intermediate and strict scrutiny. In
Califano v Webster, the Court upheld a statutory classification
that allowed women to eliminate more low-earning years than men
for purposes of computing social security retirement benefits, al-
though the effect of the classification was to allow women higher
monthly benefits than were available to men with the same earning
history. 37 Noting that women "have been unfairly hindered from
earning as much as men," the Court concluded that the statute
"works directly to remedy some part of the effect of past discrimi-
nation.' 318 The past discrimination was not attributed to an identi-
fiable governmental actor, nor was the statute limited to those
132 Id at 395-96.
133 Id at 398.
134 Croson, 488 US at 489.
1 See Section I.A.2.
138 See text accompanying notes 75-81.
237 430 US 313, 314-21 (1977).
138 Id at 318.
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women who could prove that they had been individual victims of
discrimination."3 9
Strict scrutiny would have required a showing that every em-
ployer in the country systematically discriminated against women
in terms of hiring or salaries. Had the statute at issue in Califano
been one that granted a similar race-specific preference, evidence
that blacks earned lower retirement benefits than whites would not
have constituted the factual predicate necessary under strict scru-
tiny. The Court would have questioned whether some blacks chose
to work in lower paying jobs for reasons such as long-term security
or job satisfaction.140 The statute would benefit many black work-
ers who were not the victims of discrimination, and it could not be
said to work "directly to compensate [blacks] for past economic
discrimination. '141
Similarly, in Schlesinger v Ballard,142 the Court upheld a fed-
eral statute that granted female naval officers a preferential tenure
program. The statute allowed female officers a thirteen year ten-
ure of commissioned service before mandatory discharge, but ac-
corded male officers only a nine year tenure. Women were denied
combat duty-an area that has historically afforded opportunities
for promotion-and therefore had fewer opportunities for promo-
tion than their male counterparts. 143 No specific evidence of dis-
crimination existed, nor was any required. The Court recognized
circumstances that could lead to fewer opportunities for women,
noted that this was one factor to blame for the relative paucity of
higher-ranking female officers, and decided that the statute served
an important government interest.14 4 Had the Schlesinger Court
employed a Croson-style requirement of evidence, it would have
noted that in an era of peace, no naval officers would have combat
duty. Thus, female officers, though not the victims of discrimina-
tion, would directly benefit from the gender classification.
Some courts believe that Mississippi University for Women v
Hogan145 stiffened the factual predicate necessary to sustain a gen-
der classification.146 They are incorrect. Although the Court in Ho-
"* Id at 314-21.
140 In Croson, Justice O'Connor noted that blacks may be attracted disproportionately
to other jobs unrelated to construction. 488 US at 503.
"I Califano, 430 US at 318.
142 419 US 498, 505-10 (1975).
143 Id at 508.
14 Id at 508-10.
145 458 US 718 (1982).
141 See, for example, Contractors Ass'n 735 F Supp at 1300-01.
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gan demanded that a gender classification have an "exceedingly
persuasive justification,' 14 7 it did not require a specific showing of
past discrimination by the acting institution. The Hogan Court
still required that the law be substantially related to an important
government objective. 148 Further, the Court discussed and reaf-
firmed its opinions in Califano and Schlesinger-decisions that
sustained gender-specific preference programs without requiring
proof of specific instances of past discrimination. 49 Those cases
are easily distinguishable from the facts in Hogan, the Court
wrote, for in Califano women had a history of lower-paying jobs
because of their gender, and in Schlesinger women were barred
from combat duty because of their gender. 50 In Hogan, women did
not lose opportunities in nursing because of their gender, so the
policy did not compensate for discrimination against women.'8 '
Had men dominated the nursing profession-the kind of dispro-
portionate representation that exists, for example, in the construc-
tion industry against minorities-the Court would have upheld the
university's admissions policy without demanding a showing that
the university itself participated in specific instances of past dis-
crimination. Hogan did not tighten the factual requirements of the
intermediate standard.
The Court, then, has created an unmistakably less demanding
factual requirement for intermediate review, and lower courts
should not obfuscate the distinction. The courts in Contractors
Ass'n and Lamprecht ignored that distinction, and improperly
perceived a difference between the Supreme Court's adoption of
strict scrutiny and its use of a strict factual predicate. There is
none.
The Court created intermediate scrutiny to review the distinct
issues and problems that arise in gender classifications. It is a
loosely-defined standard, inconsistent with the carefully delineated
evidentiary requirements for strict scrutiny. As the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania acknowledged, the three-tiered system of
equal protection review is best described as a "continuum [that]
provides the court with 'buzz words' (i.e. 'compelling state inter-
est,' 'important governmental interest' and 'rational basis') that in
147 458 US at 724, citing Kirchberg v Feenstra, 450 US 455, 461 (1981).
148 Id at 725.
149 Id at 728-29.
150 Id.
... Id at 729-30.
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practice are at times both difficult to distinguish and to apply. 15 2
A court, in deciding whether a gender classification survives inter-
mediate scrutiny, is explicitly or implicitly deciding what amount
of factual evidence is necessary for a finding that a governmental
objective is important. The factual predicate required cannot be
equal to that needed to support a racial classification-if it were,
there would be no reason for an intermediate standard of review.
When a court applies intermediate scrutiny but requires Croson-
style factual support, it is essentially applying strict scrutiny. Such
a judicial feint is inconsonant with the purpose of the three-tiered
system of equal protection review.
CONCLUSION
The Court's reevaluation of race-specific preference programs
reflects an emphasis on the consistent protection of individual
rights. This perspective requires strict scrutiny for all racial classi-
fications, regardless of purpose. Similarly, it requires intermediate
scrutiny for all gender classifications. Croson addressed only race-
specific affirmative action programs; strict scrutiny has never been
appropriate for the review of gender classifications. The Court has
been more willing to tolerate gender classifications than racial clas-
sifications, and the intermediate standard is rooted in that
predisposition.
Intermediate scrutiny remains appropriate for gender-based
affirmative action programs, but intermediate scrutiny must re-
main intermediate. Appending a Croson-style factual predicate to
the standard disingenuously transforms it into strict scrutiny.
Where Congress rather than local government enacts the gender
preference, an even more lenient review of the factual predicate is
appropriate. If the Court desires an unsparing factual predicate for
intermediate scrutiny, it will add one. As long as it remains silent,
lower courts must continue to apply the intermediate scrutiny
standard as the Court has consistently formulated it.
I'l Contractors Ass'n, 735 F Supp at 1303.
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